Abstract. We show that there is a pair of disjoint N P-sets, whose disjointness is provable in S 1 2 and which cannot be separated by a set in P=poly, if the cryptosystem RSA is secure. Further we show that factoring and the discrete logarithm are implicitly de nable in any extension of S 1 2 admitting an N P -de nition of primes about which it can prove that no number satisfying the de nition is composite. As a corollary we obtain that the Extended Frege (EF) proof system does not admit feasible interpolation theorem unless the RSA cryptosystem is not secure, and that an extension of EF by tautologies p (p primes), formalizing that p is not composite, as additional axioms does not admit feasible interpolation theorem unless factoring and the discrete logarithm are in P=poly .
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2 admitting an N P -de nition of primes about which it can prove that no number satisfying the de nition is composite. As a corollary we obtain that the Extended Frege (EF) proof system does not admit feasible interpolation theorem unless the RSA cryptosystem is not secure, and that an extension of EF by tautologies p (p primes), formalizing that p is not composite, as additional axioms does not admit feasible interpolation theorem unless factoring and the discrete logarithm are in P=poly . 2 The NP 6 = coNP conjecture is equivalent to the statement that no propositional proof system (as de ned in 6]) admits polynomial size proofs of all tautologies. However, only for few proof systems occurring in the literature explicit superpolynomial lower bounds are known; see 9] for a survey (and for important connections to bounded arithmetic).
The following approach to proving lower bounds for propositional proof system was proposed in 8]. 3 Various interesting tautologies expressing some nite combinatorial principles (e.g., modular counting principles as in 8]) can be formulated in a form of an implication (x; y) ! (x; z) ? We say that a proof system P admits e ective interpolation if there is a polynomial p(x) such that whenever m is the minimal size of a P-proof of ! then there is an interpolant whose circuit-size is at most p(m). Then any two sets A; B (de nable in a way as above) that cannot be separated by a set of small circuit complexity give rise to an implication whose all P-proofs must be large. Thus we get in this way lower bounds for proof systems admitting e ective interpolation.
This idea works for some proof systems, most notably for resolution and cutting planes proof systems (see 27, 2, 10, 4, 25, 11, 26, 12] ). In this paper we study limitations to this method. In particular, we shall show that Extended Frege proof system does not admit e ective interpolation unless the RSA cryptosystem is not secure.
The assumption about RSA is stronger than P=poly 6 = NP , so it will be very di cult to prove. However, the system has been extensively tested and its security seems very likely. Thus our result essentially rules out the possibility of applying e ective interpolation for proving lower bounds for EF or any stronger proof system.
Our proof can be brie y described as follows. The security of RSA gives a pair A; B of disjoint NP -sets that cannot be separated by a set in P=poly . Given the pair we construct a sequence of tautologies of the form n ! n whose interpolants must have large circuit complexity. We shall show, on the other hand, that these implications have polynomial size proof in EF. This violates e ective interpolation. It would be very tedious and formal to construct the EF-proofs explicitly. We use instead a relation between EF and a rst-order theory S 1 2 . In particular, a provability of the disjointness in S 1 2 implies the existence of polynomial size EFproofs of the implications n ! n (those proofs can be, in principle, explicitly constructed). Moreover, this relation also allows us to deduce some independence results for S 1 2 from the RSA assumption. Namely, S 1 2 proves neither Fermat's little theorem nor the weak pigeonhole principle for polynomial-time functions.
We shall consider two additional cryptographical assumptions: the hardness of factoring and of the discrete logarithm. The security of RSA presupposes the hardness of factoring but it is open if it su ces. We shall prove a similar results using these assumptions but only for a theory presumably stronger than S 1 2 . These results imply similarly the impossibility of e ective interpolation for the quanti ed propositional proof system G (its fragment G 3 , in fact).
De ning S 1 2 and presenting the basic results about this theory would make this paper too long. A reader not familiar with this subject may consult 9].
The symbol (a; b) denotes the greatest common divisor. 1 A disjoint NP -pair based on RSA RSA is the most commonly used public key cryptosystem, see 29] . It works as follows. For two su ciently large primes p and q we take n := p q. An encoding key, that is public, is a pair (n; e), where 1 < e < n. An x < n is encoded by y := x e mod n. The secret decoding key is a number d such that e d 1 mod '(n), where '(n) is the Euler function. To decode x from y compute x := y d mod n. RSA can be used to encode securely single bits by encoding a random even (resp. odd) x < n if the bit is 0 (resp. 1). The security of this probabilistic encryption is know to be as good as that of RSA, see 1]. Our pair of disjoint NP -sets is based on it. We shall show in S 1 2 that for every y there is at most one x < n which satis es the de ning formula of either A 0 or A 1 . The proof is easy, since we put everything in the de nition. So suppose that for some x 0 ; x 1 < n, r 0 (we do not need r 1 The advantage of this pair is that we do not have to mention primes as it is the case with other examples based on conjectured one-way functions. The problem with primes is that it is unlikely that the NP-de nition of primes of Pratt 24 ] is provably in S 1 2 equivalent to the natural coNP-de nition. If it were so, we would immediately get a polynomial time algorithm for factoring. Let Namely, take y of minimal length such that 1 < y^yjx. Then A(y) holds as otherwise Composite(y) would follow and we would get a proper divisor of x of length smaller than that of y. Now we can apply Buss's theorem 3] which gives a polynomialtime algorithm which nds a prime divisor y of x. 2
The reader might compare this statement with Theorem 12. Suppose the converse. Then, again by Buss's theorem, we get an r by a polynomial time algorithm. Such an r su ces to break the RSA. Namely, if y x e mod n and (e; r 0 ) = 1, where r 0 is the order of y, then r 0 jr and hence also r 0 jr 0 for r 0 = r=(e; r). Thus we have also (e; r 0 ) = 1 and y r0 1 mod n, and we compute the inverse of e modulo r 0 and continue as in the proof of Theorem 1. 2
In particular, if RSA is secure then S 1 2 cannot prove Fermat-Euler theorem. Surely it is possible to get a lot of independence results using such assumptions, however the above sentence is rather special, since it easily follows from the weak Pigeon Hole Principle (WPHP). Thus we get:
Corollary4. If RSA is secure, then S 1 2 6 WPHP( b 1 ).
Proof.
Fix n and y prime to each other and take the function r 7 ! y r mod n. By WPHP we get r 1 < r 2 < 2n such that y Assume Pratt(p) and pjab but that p does not divide a. Then (a; p) (which is de nable in S 1 2 ) must be equal to 1 by and we get (also in S 1 2 ) pu + av = 1 for some u; v, and so also: pub + avb = b : By pjab, p divides the left-hand side and hence pjb as well. This proves the claim.
To prove the theorem let pq = p 0 q 0 : Recall that Pratt(a) is the 
It is an interesting open question to determine if is provable in S 1
2 . The only obstacle to a proof of in S 1 2 is that we are unable to prove in S 1 2 a corollary of Fermat-Euler theorem: n > 1^(y; n) = 1 ! 9r < n; y r 1 mod n :
To see this assume that p 2 Pratt with g the primitive root of p from a witness w of the fact that p 2 Pratt. For the sake of contradiction assume that p 2
Composite. Then p is either a product p = ab of two coprime a; b or p is a power p = a`of some a = 2 Composite and` 2 (this is obtained in S 1 2 by looking at a decomposition p = a b with a of the minimal possible length, employing the claim from the proof of Theorem 7). The corollary of Fermat-Euler theorem would then imply that the orders of g modulo a and b are r < a and s < b respectively. Hence the order of g modulo p is at most rs (a?1)(b?1) < p?1 in the case p = ab, and at most ra`? 1 (a ? 1)a`? 1 < p ? 1 in the case p = a`. This contradicts the assumption that g is a primitive root of p. Note that by Theorem 3 it is unlikely that the above corollary of Fermat-Euler theorem is provable in S 1 2 . However, it is provable in T 3 2 (see 23] or 9]). Hence we get the following statement. We observe that these problems are essentially equivalent. In fact, their equivalence as well as the completeness result for this pair follow simply from known relations between bounded arithmetic and propositional logic (see 10]). For the reader not familiar with those relations we sketch a direct argument.
Let us agree that we shall omit the restriction of being CNF in the de nition of SAT and REF(P) and, instead, let us take all formulas in some complete basis.
First suppose that we can e ectively separate SAT and REF(P) . We shall show how to interpolate a sequent ( p; q) ! ( p; r) with a proof d of length t. Let an assignment a for p be given. Consider the formula : (a; r). If it is satis able, then our procedure for separating SAT and REF(P) will tell us that and we put F(d; a) = 0. If, on the other hand, (a; q) is satis able, then we get a proof of (a; r) at most polynomially longer than d, since we only need to evaluate (a; q) on the satisfying assignment and then apply the proof of the sequent. Thus our procedure will tell us the answer also in this case.
For the converse we have to assume that the proof system P is su ciently strong, namely, that it proves instances of its own Re ection Principle by proofs of polynomial size. This is true for EF and its various extensions; if stated carefully, it can be proved also for some (apparently) weaker systems, see 9].
So assume that we can e ectively compute an interpolation function F(d; x).
Let a formula of length n be given. Consider the re ection principle for : : The interest in this problem stems from the fact that an upper bound for interpolation for P can yield a lower bound to the size of P-proofs. The idea, discussed in 8, Sec.5] and implemented for independence results for bounded arithmetic in 27] and for lower bounds for propositional logic in 10], is to prove an upper bound on the complexity of an interpolation function F for a proof system P, and then nd a pair of disjoint NP -sets, which are harder to separate than it is to compute F. The natural encoding of the disjointness condition for the pair thus gives a sequent which cannot have a short P-proof.
On the other hand, if such a sequent does have a short P-proof then one gets a lower bound for the interpolation function for P. In this way Theorem 1 gives:
Corollary 10. Assuming that RSA is secure against an adversary computing functions in P=poly, no interpolation function for EF is in P=poly, i.e., there is a sequence of sequents which have polynomial size EF-proofs, but do not have polynomial size interpolation circuits. 9x; d; r 0 (n; e; y; x; d; r) ! :9x; d; r 1 (n; e; y; x; d; r);
and it is a b 1 -formula, the translations of this formula into propositional calculus have polynomial size EF-proofs (see 5, 14] or 9, Chpt.9]). If RSA is secure, we cannot interpolate them by polynomial size circuits. 2
The above result means that e ective interpolation very likely fails for EF and for stronger systems. Still, it is possible that some weaker version of it is true. In particular, we may replace the condition of non-separability of a disjoint NP -pair A, B by a set in P=poly by the following weaker condition: the pair cannot be separated by a pair of disjoint coNP -sets. That is, there are no disjoint coNP -sets A 0 A and B 0 B. Our example based on RSA does not rule out this version, as A; B are complements of each other so both are coNP already.
For a proof system P this weaker form of e ective interpolation follows easily from what we shall call an e ective disjunction property:
There exists a polynomial p(x) such that whenever and are two formulas without a common atom and such that the disjunction _ has a P-proof of size m, then one of , has a P-proof of size at most p(m). Cut-free sequent calculus, resolution and cutting planes (which all have e ective interpolation) admit e ective disjunction property. We do not know whether it holds for F or EF. Some limitations to it are pointed out in 13]. Corollary11. Assuming that RSA is secure against an adversary computing functions in a class C closed under polynomial time reductions, the pair of NP -sets (SAT ; REF(EF)) cannot be separated by a set in C.
